ABSTRACT. I formulate the Zermelo-Russell paradox for naive set theory. A sketch is given of Zermelo's solution to the paradox: the cumulative type structure. A careful analysis of the set formation process shows a missing component in this solution: the necessity of an assumed imaginary jump out of an infinite universe. Thus a set is formed by a suitable combination of concrete and imaginary operations all of which can be made or assumed by a Turing machine. Some consequences are drawn from this improved analysis of the concept of set, for the theory of sets and for the philosophy and foundations of mathematics.
1 Cantorian Sets. Cantor defined in 1895 a set as "any collection of definite, distinguishable objects of our intuition or of our intellect to be conceived as a whole." This is the conceptual basis of the so-called naive set theory, and it leads directly to contradictions.
2 Russell's Paradox. We operate in the domain V of all sets. Let r be the collection of all sets which are not members of themselves:
(2-1) r = {x| xx} r is clearly a set according to Cantor's definition. It is therefore meaningful to ask whether rr. By the Principle of Extensionality, (2-2) rr  rr which is a contradiction.
3 REMARK. The paradox was discovered independently by Bertrand Russell and by
Ernst Zermelo at the beginning of the twentieth century. The two men suggested solutions to the paradox based on the idea that the set universe is organised in types.
Russell based his Theory of Types explicitly on this idea. Zermelo developed his own version of the idea into the cumulative type structure and based axiomatic set theory on it. His set theory Z was later amended by Skolem and Fraenkel and by von
Neumann and Zermelo himself into Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF. Here I consider only the cumulative type structure and ZF for the following reasons: (1) ZF is still the most widely used set theory while the Theory of Types is mostly of historical interest. (2) The cumulative type structure is more general than the type structure of the Simple Type Theory; the simple types are all present in it. Moreover, the Ramified
Theory of Types has a model in ZF. I base the analysis on the expositions in Drake (1974) and Shoenfield (1977) which are more up to date than Zermelo's own account. In standard ZF, it is assumed that we have no atoms so that Level 0 is empty. The sequence of levels is assumed to have no conceivable end. Thus it is supposed that there are infinite sets and hence levels infinitely high in the hierarchy.
formulated based on the intuition of the cumulative type structure, we can define the V-hierarchy which essentially reconstructs the cumulative type structure in ZFC:
(5-1) V 0 = 
The indices are ordinals. 'On()' means that  is an ordinal. If X is a set, P(X) is the set of all subsets of X, the power set of X. The V  are sets, while V is a proper class and contains all sets. Let a be an arbitrary set. By the type of a, we understand the smallest ordinal  such that aV  . Non-empty sets have other sets as members. Sets can be members of other sets and of proper classes. Proper classes can be members of neither sets nor proper classes. This gives the solution in the cumulative type structure to Russell's paradox. By the Axiom of Foundation, Russell's class r = V so that r is a proper class. Then we cannot even ask whether rr. Alternatively: If r had been a set, it should have some type +1. Then all elements of r must be of type  or lower. As a matter of fact, no set in the Cumulative Type Structure can contain itself.
Therefore r must contain all sets, including all sets of types bigger than . Then r must both contain and not contain sets of types bigger than . Therefore r is not a set.
It is not obvious from the outset that the types should be as many as (5-1) indicates, one for every ordinal number. However, some of the properties we want the set universe to satisfy force this structure upon us. (II) Shoenfield's stages, the levels of the cumulative type structure, and the types of the V-hierarchy are the same. There is, however, an important difference between his exposition and Drake's exposition in §4. In the latter (which is close to Zermelo's original version), it apparently is suggested that the sets of the set universe exist in themselves and just happen to be organised in levels. In Shoenfield's version, the sets and the levels are the results of a formation process. I sympathise with Shoenfield's account because it explains where the levels come from. It also implies that the sets do not exist in themselves but are the results of a kind of idealised mental construction process. This leads, however, to a new problem which Shoenfield seems not to have noticed himself. Since sets are the results of a formation process, they are formed by operations which human beings can do in principle, i.e., disregarding the fact that we have only a finite memory at our disposal. For all we know, all operations we can do are such operations which can be performed by a Turing machine.
Therefore the right way to study the properties of sets is to study set forming operations which can be performed by a Turing machine. proper classes. Therefore it must be conceived of as an object, that is, it must be seen from the outside as an individual in a universe larger than the set is in itself. The set formation process is determined by the definition of the V-hierarchy together with axioms which postulate the existence of certain subsets of the V  . For finite sets, it can be considered trivial that a Turing machine can perform an object forming operation by taking the members of the set together and treat the collection as one object.
Therefore all V n and their elements can be considered sets. The formation of a finite set is a real operation which can be performed by a universal Turing machine. Now consider the infinite set V  which contains precisely the hereditarily finite sets as members. From the definition of the V-hierarchy, we can see how V  is formed. First we take the union of the finite V n , V  =  n V n . This gives us V  as a class or collection: the universe of all hereditarily finite sets. So far we can only see V  from the inside as a universe. To get V  as a set, we need to make a jump out of the universe V  and see it from the outside. Since V  is infinite, we cannot really make the jump and neither can a universal Turing machine. We must assume the jump made, and then consider the consequences of such an assumption. This kind of formation pro-cess consists of a combination of recursive set forming operations and an assumption about a jump having been made (though it really cannot be done). We call this an imaginary operation. We may compare with the proper class V =  On() V  where On() means that  is an ordinal. It is the universe of all sets. It cannot, given the premises of the cumulative type structure, be seen from the outside as an object. We cannot progress further beyond collecting all sets into a universe by assuming a jump made out of V because V occurs after all the formation stages and therefore after all possible imaginary jumps considered admissible in set theory already have been made.
(IV) From the definition of the V-hierarchy, we can see what set formation operations, real or imaginary, we need. First we form the empty set out of nothing, V 0 = .
Then we form all hereditarily finite sets by V n+1 = P(V n ), n = 0, 1, 2, … . All hereditarily finite sets can be constructed recursively. Now consider infinite sets V  where  is a limit ordinal. Assume all V  ,  < , have been formed as sets. Then V  is formed as a set as follows. First we collect all sets in the V  to a universe by taking the union V  =  < V  . Next we get V  as an object and hence a set by assuming a jump out of the universe V  . Since such a jump cannot really be done, it is a nonconstructive operation. When  = +1 is a successor ordinal, we proceed as follows to obtain V  . Assume that V  has been formed as a set. First we form the universe of all subsets of V  . This is a partly non-constructive process. In the case of V  = V  , P(V  ) can, as a potential infinity, be formed in a recursive process by using a binary tree, constructing it step by step from the root node and upwards in the tree. So far every branch and the tree as a whole represent only universes, that is, potential infinities. First we must close each of the branches into a set. This involves no jumps, real or imaginary, beyond what was needed to make V  a set. A new imaginary operation is needed, though, because the operation must be assumed to be made 2  times. Now we have P(V  ) as a universe of subsets of V  . To get P(V  ) as a set, we must assume an imaginary jump made out of the universe P(V  ), or alternatively out of the uni-verse of branches of the binary tree. In the case of  > , P(V  ) can, as a universe, be formed by using a transfinite binary tree T. If  is the cardinality of V  , the depth of T is . The subsets of V  are determined by the branches of T. We then proceed essentially as in the case of P(V  ) to get first V β+1 = P(V β ) as a universe of the subsets of V β and then, by an imaginary jump out of this universe, P(V β ) as a set. The existence axioms of ZFC can then be seen to be true in the cumulative type structure (or the V-hierarchy).
(V) To sum up: Sets do not exist in themselves. Instead they are the results of a formation process. This process consists of operations, real and imaginary, which (in principle) can be made or, in the mind, assumed made. We have found that there are at least three types of such set forming operations:
(1) Real operations which are finite recursive operations that can be performed by a universal Turing machine.
(2) Given an infinite set M, the imaginary operation consisting in the formation of the uncountable universe containing all the 2 |M| subsets of M. (An imaginary operation is a combination of a real operation with an assumption about the performance of an operation which cannot really be done.) This can be done by using for instance a transfinite binary tree of depth  where  is the cardinality of M.
(3) Given an infinite universe M seen from the inside, the imaginary operation of assuming a jump from inside the universe M and out of M so that M, after the imaginary jump out of the universe, is seen from the outside as an object in a larger universe and hence as a set. This kind of imaginary jump out of a universe is well known to almost every child after the age of 2-3 years and to almost every grown-up person. It is the imaginary jump out of oneself which the child makes when he (or she) becomes self-conscious. He reaches the stage of development where he adopts the hypothesis that he is only one individual among several others, that his inner world is not identical with the whole world but has counterparts in other similar human individuals, and that there outside him is a bigger world in which he is only one among many other individuals. 8 8 REMARK. Though the observations in the analysis are simple, they turn out to have dramatic consequences. A few will be considered here.
9 Axiomatic Method. After Zermelo's work, it has been an unquestioned dogma among set theorists that axiomatic set theory is the only acceptable way of developing theories of sets. If the set universe had existed ready-made, this should be a justifiable point of view. But sets do not exist in themselves; they are the results of a formation process consisting of real and imaginary operations. In contrast to sets, operations do exist in the physical world. Then their mathematical counterparts, operations by the universal Turing machine and recursive functions, can also be assumed to exist. From this point of view, the right way of developing a theory of sets is to take a mathematical theory of computations and recursive functions as starting point and study the set formation process: the set forming real operations performed by Turing machines and the interplay between real operations and assumptions in imaginary set forming operations. Derive from these foundations what sets there can be and which properties they have! I call this procedure operational set theory and contrast it with axiomatic set theory. I claim that operational set theory, rather than the theory of types and axiomatic set theory, is the right solution to the set paradoxes. The axiomatic approach to set theory and mathematics in general is not the only possible approach, and sometimes it is not the best approach either.
10 Unsolved Problems. (I) The most important contributions to set theory during the second half of the twentieth century are the discovery of forcing and Boolean-valued models and the proofs that some hitherto unsolved problems of set theory are unsolvable in the existing set theories like ZFC. Notable examples of unsolved problems are the Continuum Hypothesis, the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis, Souslin's problem, and the existence of large cardinals. This calls for the formulation of new axioms which can be seen to be true in the cumulative type structure and which imply solutions to the unsolved problems. It has turned out to be unexpectedly difficult to find acceptable axioms and very little progress has been made during the last halfcentury. The suggestion here is that operational set theory might be helpful to provide progress towards a solution. The methods tried so far are based only on an intuitive understanding of the cumulative type structure. The contention is that a careful analysis of the set formation process, the real and imaginary operations which generate the sets, can produce sufficiently adequate and precise information about what sort of sets can exist and what properties they have and which sets cannot exist to allow a complete answer to the unsolved problems -or alternatively prove that they are unsolvable in an absolute sense. In operational set theory, we will no longer be handicapped by the vagueness hampering mere intuition. Moreover, the representation of operations by recursive functions might make it possible to apply the ChurchTuring thesis in the solution of problems in operational set theory.
(II) As an example, we consider the Continuum Problem. By the relative consistency and independence results by Gödel and Cohen, the continuum problem is unsolvable in ZFC. Since the V-hierarchy is definable in ZFC and the V-hierarchy is a cumulative type structure according to the conditions given by Zermelo, the cumulative type structure as defined does not contain a solution to the continuum problem. To solve it, we need to develop the cumulative type structure further. This implies developing the concept of a set further. The program of operational set theory attempts to do just that. It might turn out that the continuum problem is solvable in operational set theory. If it does not turn out so, it might, on ontological grounds, be possible to argue convincingly that operational set theory is as far as it is possible to develop the concept of set. This might then be a way to show that the continuum problem is unsolvable in an absolute sense. by ordinal induction up to 2. Then we must show
For the part of the proof which consists of induction up to  and the conclusion n A(n), it suffices to consider  a universe (a potential infinity). But for the rest of the proof, lines (11-4) and (11-5), we need  as a set. In particular, the conclusion A() demands that  is a set. This, in turn, demands that we assume the existence of an imaginary jump out of the universe  = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Since such a jump cannot really be made, it is non-constructive. In other words, every inductive proof over the ordinals which goes beyond the natural numbers is non-constructive. To make the induction, we do not really need the ordinal +. We might instead for instance use the isomorphic structure {0, 2, 4, . . ., 1, 3, 5, . . .} Here 1 has the same place as . 1 is not, or need not be considered, a set. This makes no essential difference. In order to come to 1 in the inductive process, we must make an imaginary, and hence non-constructive, jump out of the universe {0, 2, 4, . . .}.
Neo-intuitionists claim that modern constructive mathematics has no problems with infinite sets. It (and the neo-intuitionists) ought to have. Every infinite set involves at least one imaginary jump out of a universe and therefore is non-constructive. 
It is understood that {0, 1}
A contains only the recursive functions from A to {0, 1}.
Let A = N. Being recursive, it is a CZF set and we then get as a CZF set {0, 1} N containing all recursive functions from N to {0, 1}. It is, of course, countable. On the other hand, the uncountable classical set {0, 1} N is not a CZF set. The trouble for CZF and MLTT is that the classical {0, 1} N , as a potential infinity, seems to be con-structive. Consider the complete binary tree. Label each edge towards the left from a node by 0 and each edge to the right from a node by 1. This labelled tree can be constructed by a recursive procedure which yields all the nodes and the tree structure and therefore also all the branches as a potential infinity. There are continuum many branches in the tree, and each branch is identical with a sequence in the classical Therefore the full binary tree is a recursively enumerable structure and therefore the corresponding class P(N) ought to be considered a legitimate MLTT and CZF set, it seems. My purpose here is, of course, not to show that the classical set P(N) is a constructive set. In Analysis 7, I have showed that it is not. My purpose is to show that based on the philosophical principles which Martin-Löf and Aczel take as conceptual foundations of MLTT and CZF, P(N) ought to be included as a set in these theories.
(III) The situation is even worse. Since  = {0, 1, 2, . . .} is recursive, it is a CZF set.
Then by Exponentiation (11-6), {0, 1}  is a CZF set. The members of {0, 1}  are all the recursive functions f:   {0, 1}. Let K  :   {0, 1} be the characteristic function for . Then K  is the constant function K  (n) = 1 for all n so that K  is recursive and hence K   {0, 1} In category theory, f is called the stripping functor because it strips the group of all structure and leaves only the naked set G. Since G and V are proper classes, they can be defined in NBG set theory; but there is no way to define f as a set or class. Nevertheless, f is a natural and useful mathematical object in the given context, and it does not seem to lead to contradictions to introduce such mappings. The solution, first suggested by Eilenberg and MacLane, is to introduce the concept of a category. A category is a collection of mappings, called morphisms. The idea is that the proper-ties of objects like algebraic structures, topological spaces, sets, and classes can be defined in terms of properties of the morphisms which have the objects as domains or co-domains.
(II) Using such methods, we can also study sets and the set universe. One such theory is CS, the theory of the category of all sets. A more powerful alternative is topos theory. Both theories were created and developed by F. W. Lawvere, and topos theory also by M. Tierney. The basic idea is to look at sets and classes from the outside as black boxes. In physics, a black box is characterised by the causal relations it has to other objects. In mathematics, a black box is characterised by the functional relations it has to other mathematical objects. This is precisely how category theory works:
Properties of the morphisms are used to define the inner properties of the sets and classes -including proper classes like V -which are domains or co-domains of the morphisms. There are some problems with the categorial approach to sets and classes.
(1) If sets had existed in themselves, the categorial way of defining the properties of sets and classes had been fully acceptable. As we have seen, sets are the results of a formation process. Therefore this formation process must provide the primary definition of sets and their properties. The categorial method is only an interesting secondary way of characterising these properties. Moreover some of the constructions of set theoretical entities in category theory are highly unnatural.
(2) Since some of the mappings (functors) of CS and topos theory can be defined in neither ZF nor NBG, these entities go beyond all the stages of the formation process for sets. How can there be any construction of mathematical objects beyond all the stages of set theory? And how can we avoid that these constructions lead to contradictions?
(3) How can set theory and category theory be unified? We have already seen that category theory contains entities which cannot be defined in set theory and class theory. Hence neither ZF nor NBG can be suitable frameworks for a unification. Therefore the established way to achieve a unification is topos theory. But as we saw, this leads directly to Problem (1). We still need a natural way to unify the two theories, which treats sets as sets and not only as objects in a category and which allows the smooth transition from set operations to category operations.
(III) My suggestion is that the switch from axiomatic set theory to operational set theory provides solutions to these three problems. First the set universe V is formed by iterating the set forming operations (real or imaginary) as far as possible. How can we make an imaginary jump out of V to the universe of CS or topos theory? We note that we have not made all imaginary jumps which are generally possible out of universes. We have done something more special. We have only made all possible imaginary jumps which are compatible with the preserved transparency of the classes.
When we see a class from the inside, it is completely characterised by its members.
After the jump out of the class/universe, when we see it as a set, the set is still completely characterised by its members. It remains transparent. Therefore it is logically possible that we make an imaginary jump out of the universe V of all sets if V by this operation loses its transparency. After the imaginary jump, V becomes a black box -just as in CS and topos theory. This solves Problem (2), and it also solves problems (1) and (3). By focusing on the operations, those which form the sets and those which lead to the universes of CS and topos theory, we get a natural, unified theory of sets and categories.
13 Foundations of Mathematics. (I) The two dominant proposals for a foundational system for classical mathematics are axiomatic set theory and topos theory. We have seen that none of them is adequate. Axiomatic set theory is incomplete as foundations because it does not allow the development of category theory within the set theoretical framework. Topos theory is inadequate because it conceptually presupposes set theory. My own proposal is that a mathematical theory of operations, including imaginary operations, should provide more adequate foundations of mathematics. Since every operation by Turing's thesis can be represented by a recursive function, the theory of computation in combination with logic is the proper founda-tions of mathematics. Another objection to axiomatic set theory and topos theory is that they cannot explain "the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics" in physics.
In contrast, a theory of operations can give such an explanation. The reason is that physics is concerned with such systems in the real world which can be defined by simple operational definitions. (It can even be argued that reality itself is operationally definable, as in Hansen (1996c) .) By Turing's thesis, all such systems can be represented by recursive functions which are the entities studied in a mathematical theory of operations. (Incidentally, this also explains the "unreasonable" effectiveness of mathematics in logic because mathematical logic mostly studies recursively axiomatisable theories. For essentially the same reason, it also explains the "unreasonable" effectiveness of mathematics in computer science because computers are recursive systems and they do nothing but calculate recursive functions.) (II) An important philosophy of mathematics is structuralism, the idea that:
Mathematics is the science of structure.
In one version, due to the Bourbaki group, the structures are supplied by set theory.
In a more recent version, due to Lawvere and Tierney, the structures come from category theory. Several objections can be raised against structuralism in mathematics, for instance:
(1) As we have seen, neither axiomatic set theory nor topos theory are adequate as foundations of mathematics. None of them supplies sufficiently much structure to suffice for all of mathematics. Considerations of structure no doubt play an immense role in mathematics; but they do so in connection with single problems and individual mathematical theories like real analysis, complex analysis, and geometries. The case for believing that there is one theory of mathematics that can supply all structures which are used or ever can be used in mathematics is weak.
(2) Logic is an integral part of every mathematical theory. The structural view on logic is adopted in formal logic. In Hansen (1996a) , I showed that the formalisation of logic in an essential way distorts the logic.
(III) My own idea about the nature of mathematics is:
Mathematics is problem solving.
The fundamental mathematical problems come from operationally definable reality.
This philosophy avoids the problems hampering structuralism. Assuming that a human being is a Turing machine, every problem a human being can ask can be represented in a Turing machine and therefore in the mathematical theory of operations.
The theory of Turing machines and recursive functions is the kernel of mathematics, but it is not the whole of mathematics. Gödel's incompleteness theorems show that the theory of operations cannot be the whole of mathematics. It must gradually be extended with the assumptions that are parts of those imaginary operations which are supplements to the concrete operations. This gives a third objection to structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics. 14 The -Rule. We operate in the language L(PA) of Peano arithmetic PA. In this language, we can formulate the -rule. Let A(x) be a formula having only 'x' free.
Then the -rule is the infinitary rule:
Let N be the standard model of PA, and let Th(N) be the set of all sentences of L(PA) which are true in N. Then Th(N) is complete arithmetic, and we have:
PA + the -rule = Th(N)
In (1996b), I prove a slightly stronger result: All arithmetical calculations plus the predicate logic for L(PA) plus the -rule yields complete arithmetic. Therefore all arithmetical theory is really implicit in the -rule. Consensus among set theorists is that there is not and cannot be anything corresponding to the -rule for a set theory like ZF. I am not convinced about the correctness of this conclusion. If we compare the -rule with the induction principle, we see that while the induction principle is finitary, the -rule is essentially infinitary as can be inferred by Gödel's incompleteness theorem. In the sequence of applications of the -rule needed to obtain complete arithmetic, infinitely many involve a jump out of an infinite universe, just as in the set formation process. This gives a set theoretical interpretation of the -rule. My conjecture is that operational set theory amended with the -rule (set theoretically interpreted) implies solutions to problems which are unsolvable in ZFC. Possibly it might even hold and be provable that ZF + the -rule = complete set theory My hope is that the -rule for instance might help to solve the continuum problem in operational set theory.
15 Set Theoretical Existence. An axiomatic set theory like ZF contains a number of claims about the existence of sets. One axiom implies the existence of an empty set.
The Power Set Axiom says that for every set X there is a set P(X), called the power set of X, which contains all the subsets of X. A third axiom implies that there is an infinite set. It would seem that belief in ZF commits one to believe in the existence of the sets which can be proved in ZF to exist. Philosophically this is odd. Many, including myself, would be unwilling to admit the existence in the physical world of at least infinite sets and would also be unwilling to believe in a Platonic world inhabited by sets and other abstract entities.
Operational set theory solves this problem. Hereditarily finite sets can be constructed by recursive operations of a Turing machine. We may therefore either say that these sets do not exist in the physical world but can be constructed by recursive operations which do exist in the physical world or else say that these sets do exist because they can be identified with the systems of recursive operations by which they are constructed. From the point of view of operational set theory, the question of the existence of hereditarily finite sets is without real content. For infinite sets, the situation is different. As shown above, infinite sets are the results of one or more imaginary operations. Imaginary operations are hypothesised. Since they are the result of a hypothesis, they do not commit us to believe in the existence of infinite sets -neither in the physical universe nor in a Platonic universe. Gödel has, in the incompleteness theorems, proved that such hypotheses on seeing a universe from the outside as an object can lead to powerful insights which cannot be attained without this kind of hypotheses. Such insights are the sole raison d'être of set theory.
16 NOTE. The present paper contains the basic ideas in a research program for set theory. As such it is necessarily sketchy. I have tried to expose the conceptual and ontological ideas in this program in as simple and intuitive a way as I could, and I hope that at least a few readers will be able to see the vision behind the program as clearly as I feel that I do. The ideas in Analysis 7 on operational set theory, based on real and imaginary operations, are original. The seven suggestions on applications of operational set theory in § § 9-15 are also original.
